155
SECTION V—THE HEADQUARTERS STAFF
The original request from Great Britain asked for two battalions to forward to join four Imperial and Indian battalions already stationed there. Subsequently, on October 11, 1941, an additional request was made that Canada should, if possible, supply a modified headquarters force, consisting of approxi- mately eighty officers and men. This request made it clear that if Canada could not provide any or all of this force by the time of sailing, the War Office in Great Britain would do so, and that the dispatch of the two battalions should not be delayed on that account.
On receipt of this cablegram, the Acting Chief of the General Staff (Lieu- tenant-General Stuart) conferred by telephone with Colonel Ralston and General Crerar, who were then on their way to England. General Stuart recommended that Colonel J. K. Lawson should be given command of the force and that Colonel P. Hennessy should be made its senior administrative officer. Colonel Ralston consulted with General Crerar and obtained his recommen- dation that this additional responsibility should be assumed by Canada. He ascertained that Colonel Lawson's position as Director of Training could be filled without interfering with military training in Canada. Thereupon Colonel Ralston gave his assent to the proposal and recommended its adoption. The matter was then referred to the Associate Minister of National Defence, who also gave his approval, and this was subsequently confirmed by the War Com- mittee of the Cabinet. Great Britain was advised that the headquarters force would be provided and that the dispatch of the two battalions would not thereby be delayed.
Colonel Lawson was appointed to command the Canadian force with the rank of Brigadier and Colonel Hennessy was appointed senior administratitve officer of the force. The other personnel of the headquarters staff was selected and sailed with the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers to Hong Kong. Certain special Canadian details were added to those requested by Great Britain, with the result that a total headquarters personnel of 97 sailed to Hong Kong on October 27.
The members of the headquarters staff are, of course, more concerned with administrative duties than with actual combat against the enemy. It is desir- able, however, that all such personnel should be sufficiently trained to take part in the fighting if need arises. All of the officers on the headquarters staff were fully trained. All of the men, except four, had served in the active army for upwards of sixteen weeks. Of these four, one was a tradesman in the Ordnance Corps who had only 13 weeks service, two were provosts in the mili- tary police who had fourteen weeks service each, and one was a signaller with fourteen weeks' service. I am of the opinion that these deficiencies in time spent in the army are of no significance.
SECTION VI-DETAILS OF ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCE
By the Order in Council directing this Inquiry, I was required to examine into the organization of the Canadian expedition to Hong Kong and particularly to investigate "the provision and maintenance of supplies, equipment and ammunition and of the transportation therefor". This required a lengthy and somewhat wearisome examination of the multitudinous details relating to the preparation and dispatch of the force. It was a matter of some surprise to me to learn how complicated were the preparations necessary for such an expedition, and how much was accomplished by those in charge of the organiza- tion of the force in a very brief period.
After thus examining in detail the steps taken to make ready the expedi- tion, I concluded that only one matter required exhaustive discussion in this Report-namely, the provision and dispatch of mechanical transport for the Canadian force. This subject will be discussed in the next section. I feel that no useful purpose will be served in giving, in wearisome detail, all the other matters concerning the organization and dispatch of the expedition-all of which were successfully handled and concerning which no possible question arises. It is sufficient to state a conclusion in general terms as to the organiza- tion of the force.
The provisioning of such a force falls under three divisions-general stores, technical stores and mechanical transport-each of which is administered by a Director in the Department of the Master-General of the Ordnance. General stores include all supplies except weapons, ammunition and mechanical trans- port. All required general stores were provided for the expedition to Hong Kong and accompanied the troops on the ship carrying them to their desination. Technical stores include weapons and ammunition and the necessary supplies of reserves, spare parts, tools, etc. A list of technical stores supplied to the Hong Kong force was filed, together with a list showing in what respect the technical stores provided fell short of the prescribed establishment. These deficiencies were the subject of communications between Canadian and British Military Headquarters. There were no available Boys anti-tank rifles in Canada in October, 1941. Nor was there ammunition for 2" and 3" mortars available in Canada at the time. These facts were reported to the British authorities. Their reply expressed gratification respecting the equipment the Canadian units would take to Hong Kong, and stated that the deficiencies in the Boys anti-tank rifles would be made up when possible by release and delivery of such weapons direct to Hong Kong from British sources. As to the mortar ammunition, the War Office arranged to provide a supply for weekly release in Hong Kong and stated that some mortar ammunition would be available immediately from stocks already in Hong Kong. Subject to these deficiencies, the full establishment of technical stores, together with large reserves, was provided by Canada and proceeded with the expedition to Hong Kong.
Leaving aside for the moment the question of mechanical transport, I am satisfied that the expedition to Hong Kong was fully and properly equipped. It was stated by one of the senior officers at National Defence Headquarters that he believed that the "two battalions went out of this country better equipped than any units ever left the shores of this country".
48
49
156
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.